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Penalty Box or Jury Box?
Deciding Where Professional Sports Tough
Guys Should Go
McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club'

I. INTRODUCTION
To those unfamiliar with the customs of professional hockey, observing a
referee stand by while players drop their gloves and duke it out can be a
disconcerting experience. Even more disconcerting is watching last week's
highlights illustrate in slow-motion detail the bone-crushing force with which
one player slams another into the boards. The professional hockey fan, however,
knows that acts like these are the byproducts of a fast and furious game that
recognizes physical intimidation as a legitimate strategy.2 In McKichan v. St.
Louis Hockey Club,3 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of
Missouri ruled that severe body checks administered moments after a play are
"part of the game of professional hockey,"4 and therefore are not actionable as
a matter of law. Although McKichan addresses the narrow issue of the liability
of professional hockey players, the court's opinion is consistent with a majority
of recent cases that have denied recovery to injured sports participants, whatever
their level of skill, and it illustrates the more general problems courts face when
trying to gauge whether a sports participant has crossed the line dividing
enthusiastic competitors from the malfeasant.
H. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 15, 1990, the Milwaukee Admirals played the Peoria
Rivermen in Peoria, Illinois.' Both teams were members of the International
Hockey League (IHL), a professional hockey "minor league," 6 and had ties to
National Hockey League (NHL) teams.' The Rivermen, the eventual league
1. 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
2. See generally JOHN DAVIDSON, HOCKEY FOR DUMMIES

(1997); Austin Murphy,

FightingForA Living: St. Louis Blues enforcer Tony Twist, whose pugilistictalents
appearto run in thefamily, doesn 'tpull any punches on thejob, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Mar. 16, 1998, at 42, availablein 1998 WL 8979450.

3. McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 209.
4. Id. at 213.
5. Id. at 210.

6. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
7. The Vancouver Cannucks used the Milwaukee Admirals as a farm team, and the
St. Louis Blues were affiliated with the Peoria Rivermen. Brief for Appellant at 3-4,
McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (Nos. 72261,
72267).
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champions, dominated the game.' The incident giving rise to the lawsuit took
place at 15:57 in the third period9 when the score was 10-4, Peoria.' In a failed
attempt to execute a "dump-in" play," the Rivermen knocked the puck over the
goal and out of the rink. 2 A linesman blew his whistle, indicating play had
stopped, and Stephen McKichan (hereinafter McKichan), the goaltender for the
Admirals, turned from his position at the side of the goal and skated toward the
"boards," the wall surrounding the rink.1 3 A videotape of the incident revealed
that Rivermen player Tony Twist 14 (hereinafter Twist), who had been involved
in an incident 15 with McKichan in the second period, skated full speed in
McKichan's direction from the near blue line (approximately 60 feet from the
boards behind the goal).' 6 A referee blew a second whistle, 17 this time directed
at Twist. 8 Twist, however, continued toward the goaltender and deliberately"S

8. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Appellant at 3, McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club,
967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (Nos. 72261, 72267).
9. Brief for Appellant at 5.
10. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Appellant at 3-4.
11. Brief for Appellant at 5. A "dump-in" play involves gaining control of the
puck and shooting it into the opponent's end of the ice. Id. Other players then skate into
the area near the opposing team's goal and attempt to regain possession of the puck and
score a goal. Id.
12. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209,210-11 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
13. Id. at211.
14. Tony "Twister" Twist, even though playing for the Rivermen during the
December 15, 1990 game, was under contract with the St. Louis Blues. While playing
for the Blues, Twist developed a reputation as an enforcer on the ice. See generally Dave
Luecking, Ya Wanna Go? Foes Say No to Twist, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 2,
1997, at 10H, availablein 1997 WL 3375506; and Dave Luecking, An Ironic Twist Blues
Tough Guy a Softie OffIce, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1996, at 06, available
in 1996 WL 2803904; Murphy, supra note 2, at 42. During his career, which spanned

11 professional seasons and 445 games, Twist had 10 goals, 28 points, and earned 1,121
penalty minutes. See Dave Luecking, Twist is Seriously Hurt in Motorcycle Crash:
Knee, Pelvis Injuries Could End Careerof Blues Enforcer, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH,
Aug. 11, 1999, at D1, available in 1999 WL 3036024.
15. In the second period, McKichan was penalized for punching Twist in the face
with his blocker glove while Twist was involved in a scuffle with another Milwaukee
player. McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 210.
16. McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 211.
17. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
18. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Appellant at 4.
19. At trial, Twist testified that he meant to make bodily contact with McKichan.
Brief for Appellant at 6. The trial court did not permit Twist to testify that his thirdperiod check was an act of retaliation for the punch delivered by McKichan in the second
period. Id. at 10-11. If allowed, Twist's brief suggests he would have testified (as he did
in https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
his deposition) that in the course of executing the dump-in play, he saw an opportunity
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checked him in the back and side with his body and outstretched hockey stick.2"
The blow knocked McKichan into the boards and rendered him unconscious for
approximately thirteen minutes.2' Twist, who violated five separate rules of
hockey with his conduct,2 received a "match penalty"--the most severe penalty
in hockey-and was suspended by the IHL for every game Peoria played while
McKichan was injured and all subsequent games between Milwaukee and
Peoria.23
McKichan filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, seeking
damages against Twist and his owner, the St. Louis Hockey Club, (hereinafter
the Blues). 24 After Twist filed a counterclaim against McKichan, the players
dismissed their respective claims against one another, and McKichan proceeded
solely against the Blues.25 Following a two-week trial, a jury awarded
McKichan $175,000 in compensatory damages.26
On appeal, the Blues claimed the trial court erred in denying its motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the contact at issue, a check
between opposing players, was "a risk inherent in professional hockey and one
assumed by professional hockey players." 27 McKichan argued that the issue was
whether Twist's conduct was deliberate, wilful, or reckless, and that the
reviewing court need not determine whether Twist's conduct exceeded the risk
of physical contact inherent in the sport.28
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District29 of Missouri held
that the severe body check at issue was "'part of the game' of professional
hockey," and it therefore was not actionable as a matter of law.30
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Bruises, sprains, and broken bones frequently accompany the pursuit of
competitive thrills at every level of play. Not surprisingly, these injuries have
to deliver a message to McKichan that the goaltender's actions in the second period were
unfair and unacceptable. Id. at 11.
20. McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 211.
21. Id.
22. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Appellant at 5.
23. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo. Ct. App.

1998).
24. Id. at 210.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at211.
28. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Appellant at 21-22.
29. Judge Grimm wrote the opinion for a divided three-judge panel. Judge
Gaertner dissented without opinion.
30. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998). by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
Published
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spawned considerable litigation in recent years, primarily from amateur or
recreational sporting events. In general, courts have recognized three theories
of recovery (intentional tort, negligence, and recklessness) and two principle
defenses (consent and assumption of risk) in actions by one sports participant
against another.3 ' As noted by Professor Lazaroff, however, most tort law is
predicated on nonviolent human interaction whereas many sports, especially
sports like football or hockey, require participants to engage in activities that
often lead to injury even when the game is played in good faith and according
to the rules. 32 The challenge for the courts, therefore, has been to articulate a
meaningful way to determine the scope of liability in the sports setting.
A. Recoveryfor IntentionalTorts andProblems of Consent
Actions for battery or assault have produced few reported cases. Under

normal principles, a defendant is liable for battery if he acts intending to cause
harmful or offensive contact with another person (or imminent apprehension of
such contact) and harmful or offensive contact results.33 He is liable for assault
if, with the same intent, he puts the plaintiff in imminent apprehension of a
battery.34 The plaintiff need not prove the defendant intended the results of his
conduct. Instead, he must show that the defendant's act was (1) volitional, and
that (2) the defendant intended to invade dignitary interests of the plaintiff or
another person.3

31. Because the defenses of consent and assumption of risk are closely related to
(and sometimes the counterpart of) the theories of recovery, this Note describes the
defense doctrines in terms of their relationship to the theories of recovery. For general
information regarding sports participant liability, see Stanley L. Grazis, Annotation,
Liability of Participantin Team Athletic Competitionfor Injury to or Death ofAnother
Participant,55 A.L.R.5th 529 (1998); Daniel Lazaroff, Torts & Sports: Participant
Liability to Co-Participantsfor InjuriesSustainedDuringCompetition, 7 U. MIAMI ENT.
& SPORTS L. REv. 191, 194 (1990); Ray Yassar, In the Heat of Competition: Tort
Liability of One Participantto Another; Why Can't Participantsbe Required to Be
Reasonable?,5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 253, 255-57 (1995).
32. Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 194. Professor Lazaroff notes that "it is
inconceivable that professional boxing or full contact karate matches could be conducted
without some injury to one or both participants. Causing bodily harm is the very essence
of the match. Even in so-called 'noncontact' sports such as basketball or baseball,
contact with other players or their equipment is common and sometimes produces serious
injury." Id.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13 & 18 (1965).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
35. The dignitary interest protected by battery are an individual's right to be free
from harmful and offensive contact. The tort of assault is designed to protect an
individual's interest in freedom from apprehension of such contact. See FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.2, at 3:4-5 (3d ed. 1996); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL.,https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 9 & 10 (5th ed. 1984).
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Intentional tort actions fail if a defendant's contact was accidental36 or
consented to by the injured party.37 Accidental interest-invasions, often the
result of competition at close quarters, are not assaults or batteries, even if they
38
result in severe injuries, because the defendant did not intend the invasion.
Intentional interest-invasions, if consented to by the injured party, are not
tortious under the ancient principle of volenti nonfit injuria(no wrong is done
4
to one who is willing to be injured).39 Consent may be actual40 or apparent; ' that
is, inferred from the plaintiff's own participation in the game.
A frequently quoted passage in the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that
competitors who take part in a game demonstrate "a willingness to submit to
such bodily contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or
usages.,42 The Restatement further provides that a player's apparent consent

36. HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 3.3, at 3:15-16.
37. See generally HARPER ET AL., supranote 35, § 3.10, at 3:38-50. KEETONETAL,
supra note 35, §18, at 112; Yassar, supra note 31, at 255 & n.8. Professor Yassar
suggests other privileges, such as self-defense, may also play a role. Id. at 256 and n.14.
For an opinion that seems to rely on principles of self-defense, see Hanson v. Kynast, 526
N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (Milligan, J. concurring) (defendant lacrosse
player not liable for opposing player's paralyzing injuries when he reasonably defended
himself from opposing player's attack from behind by flipping opposing player over his
back).
38. See, e.g., Thomas v. Barlow, 138 A. 208, 209 (N.J. 1927) (setting aside verdict
for alleged intentional blow to the jaw in basketball game when the evidence showed it
was accidental).
39. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 18, at 112 (stating the "ancient maxim"
of volenti nonfit injuria);see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (1965). The
Restatement defines privilege as:
§ 10. PRIVILEGE

(1) The word "privilege" is used.., to denote the fact that conduct which,
under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability, under
particular circumstances does not subject him to such liability.
(2) A privilege may be based upon (a) the consent of the other affected by the
actor's conduct, or (b) the fact that its exercise is necessary for the protection
of some interest of the actor or of the public which is of such importance as
to justify the harm caused or threatened by its exercise.
Id.
40.

Actual consent is willingness in fact for the conduct to occur.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

.§ 892 (1965).

See

Not surprisingly, sports cases

ordinarily do not discuss actual consent. Even though participants choose to play a
game, it does not follow that they are willing to be tackled or tagged. In fact, the object
of the game is to avoid such contacts.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 (1965).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b (1965). See the cumulative list
of reported cases for an extensive list of citations.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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does not extend to contacts prohibited by usages or rules designed to protect
player safety.43
A literal application of this rule would seem to guarantee success to
plaintiffs injured by defendants who intentionally violated safety rules. For
instance, a football player could be liable if he intentionally "face-masks" or
"clips" another player, and the player is thereby injured. Yet, essentially no
jurisdiction has recognized batteries stemming from fairly typical rule violations,
despite the frequency with which the Restatement passages are quoted. 4 In
practice, intentional tort actions are successful only "when players step outside
their roles as fellow competitors'"45 and attack one another, such as when a
professional baseball catcher punches the batter in the back of his head,46 or an
amateur basketball player pushes another to the ground and repeatedly strikes
him in the face. 7
The unwillingness of courts to recognize safety-rule violations as a brightline test for actionability may stem from a judicial reluctance to review what
occurs on the playing-field or, more likely, from an unarticulated disagreement
with the Restatement rule. After all, apparent consent is not an independent
concept; it is a way of stating the conclusion that a plaintiff who did not actually

43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b (1965). Other commentators
argue that participants do not actually consent to unfair play or to violence exceeding that
permitted by the letter and spirit of the rules. See J.H. Beale, Jr., Consent in the Criminal
Law, 8 HARV. L. REv. 317, 323 (1895); Francis H. Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil
Liabilityfor Breaches of the Peace,24 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 822-23 n.9 (1924).
44. One exception may be found in Overallv. Kadella,361 N.W.2d 352 (Mich. Ct

App. 1984), which affirmed ajury verdict for an amateur hockey player who was injured
when another player struck him in violation of a league ban on fighting. The court,
however, also seemed to conclude that the plaintiff was no longer playing the game
because he was injured while sitting on the bench after the game clock expired. Id. at
354-55.
45. Barbara Svaranos, Comment, Fighting?It's All in a Day's Work on the Ice:
Determiningthe AppropriateStandardofa Hockey Player'sLiability to Another Player,
7 SETONHALLJ. SPORTL. 487, 500 (1997) (quoting JOHN BARNES, SPORTS AND THE LAW

258 (1988)).
46. See Averill v. Luttrell, 311 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957)
(discussing an unappealed jury verdict awarding damages for injuries sustained from an
assault and battery committed by one professional baseball player against another. The
incident arose while the plaintiff Luttrell was at bat. After being hit by a pitch, Luttrell,
in disgust, threw his bat in the general direction of the pitcher's mound. Averill, the
catcher and the defendant, stood up and punched Luttrell in the back of the head. Luttrell
was knocked unconscious and sustained a fractured jaw upon falling face first to the
ground.).
47. See Griggas v. Clasuson, 128 N.E.2d 363, 366 (I1l. App. Ct. 1955) (sustaining
a verdict for the plaintiff on assault and battery that took place in a basketball game after
the defendant pushed the plaintiff from behind and then punched him repeatedly in the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
face).
INCANADA
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consent should be treated by the law as though he had.48 Expressed another way,
it means the defendant's conduct, which in other circumstances would be
tortious, should be treated by the law as though it were not. The reported (and
absence of reported) intentional tort cases hint that most courts actually believe
the Restatement rule goes too far in imposing liability.
B. Recovery for Recklessness or Negligence andAssumption ofRisk
Most sports-related claims sound in negligence or recklessness, not in
intentional tort.49 Under general principles, a defendant may be liable under a
negligence theory for acts that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff
and cause the plaintiff's injuries. He may be liable for reckless misconduct for
acts that create a substantially greater risk of harm to the plaintiff that would
negligence, and, again, that cause the plaintiff's injuries.50 Many early decisions
discussed sport-participant liability in terms of negligence,5' or, as discussed

more fully below, in terms of whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk of
48. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, at n.10.
49. This has not always been true. The earliest cases seemed to recognize
intentional tort as the only basis for recovery. Recovery for negligence arising out of
athletic contests seemed nearly "out of the question," according to at least one early
observer. See Note, 26 MICH. L. REv. 322 (1928). Negligence actions became more
widely recognized during the 1950s and 1960s. See generally J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.02 (1979). The modem trend has been to exempt

contact sports from negligence liability, and instead require liability to be predicated on
recklessness. See infra notes 70-119 and accompanying text.
50. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, reckless misconduct differs

from negligence in several respects:
Reckless misconduct.., differs from that form of negligence which
consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure
to take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a
possible future emergency, in that reckless misconduct requires a

conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the
serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only
from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that
negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge

that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless
must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in
amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The
difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only
such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a

difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so
marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind.

§ 500 cmt. a (1965).
51. See, e.g., Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. Ct. App.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

Niemcyzk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
1961); by
Published
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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injury.52 In recent decisions, however, many courts have demonstrated a
reluctance to recognize actions for simple negligence. 53 Instead, they require
proof that the defendant engaged in intentional or reckless misconduct in order
for the plaintiff to state a cause of action.5 4
This trend toward a recklessness standard is traceable to Nabozny v.
Barnhill,55 a 1975 Illinois decision. In Nabozny, the plaintiff sought damages for
negligence after he sustained injuries during an amateur soccer match in which
he was the goaltender. 56 The defendant, ignoring a well known soccer rule
prohibiting contact with the goaltender when the goaltender is in possession of
the ball in the penalty area, charged the net and kicked the plaintiff in the head
after the plaintiff had possession of the ball.57 The court held that "a player is
liable for injury in a tort action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate,
wilful, or reckless disregard for the safety of the other player." 58 However, it
framed its decision narrowly. It stressed that the plaintiffs allegation of
negligence was cognizable because, under the circumstances, the defendant's
negligent disregard for a known safety rule was equivalent to reckless disregard
for the plaintiff's safety. 59

In subsequent decisions, Illinois courts refined and distinguished the
"contact sports exception to liability premised on negligence"6 by consistently
narrowing the application of Nabozny. They interpreted Nabozny to establish a
limited duty of care for contact sports participants-the duty to refrain from
wilful and wanton6 or intentional misconduct that causes injuries. No other

52. See infra notes 102-23 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992); Jaworski v. Kieman, 696
A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997); Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1995); Picou v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d (Mass. 1989);
Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990); Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J.
1994); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Turcotte v. Fell, 474
N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990);
Greer v. Davis, 921 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
55. 334 N.E.2d 258 (II. App. Ct. 1975).
56. Id. at 260.
57. Id.
58. Id. at261.
59. Id. Specifically, the court pointed out that (1) the teams were trained by
knowledgeable coaches, (2) the game was governed by a recognized set of rules, and (3)
the specific rule in question was designed to protect players from serious injury. Id.
60. For a discussion of the development of the exception, see Pfisterv. Shusta, 657
N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (Ill. 1995).
6 1. According to Illinois courts, wilful and wanton conduct is "a course of action
which shows actual or deliberate intent to harm or which, if the course of action is not
intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for... the safety...
of others." Pfister,657 N.E.2d at 1014-15 (citations omitted). This conduct ranges from
"acts
considered negligent [to] behavior found to be intentionally tortious" and may
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
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reported decision recognized a cause of action predicated on a safety-rule
violation, as did Nabozny, nor did any of the decisions turn on the parties' likely
or actual expectations about a particular game. For example, an injured softball
player could not recover when pushed or knocked down by another player even
though he did not anticipate such competitive play during a friendly game, which
was part of a family picnic and social day sponsored by his employer. 2 Another
Illinois court deemed it legally insignificant that the plaintiff, a child, did not or
63
could not appreciate the dangers associated with the game of "bombardment.
In Pfisterv. Shusta,64 the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed these decisions
and overruled a rogue appellate court decision65 that had recognized a negligence
cause of action arising out of an impromptu game of "kick the can." Pftster
held that participants who voluntarily engage in contact sports cannot recover for
injuries resulting from the negligence of other players. 67 As a result, Pfister
established that the courts' role in sports injury cases is to determine if the
injured party was involved in a contact sport, and, if so, to determine whether a
fact question exists as to whether the injury was caused by the wilful and
wanton ' or intentional misconduct of the defendant 9 According to the opinion,
this commonsense approach strikes an appropriate balance between society's
dual interests in limiting liability for injuries resulting from the physical contact
inherent in contact sports and in allowing recovery for injuries resulting from
reckless misconduct by other participants.70 Later decisions indicated that in
sports, such as golf or skiing, negligence remains the appropriate
non-contact
7
standard. '

differ from the two extremes by degrees only. Id.
62. Landrum v. Gonzalez, 629 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
63. Ramos v. City of Countryside, 485 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
64. 657 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. 1995).
65. Pfister v. Shusta, 627 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
66. In Pfister, four college students engaged in a spontaneous can-kicking game
in the lobby of their dormitory. In an attempt to gain control of the can, the plaintiff
pushed the defendant. Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Ill. 1995). The
defendant responded by pushing back, causing the plaintiff to fall. Id. at 1015. While
attempting to break his fall, the plaintiff put his hand and forearm through the glass door
of a fire extinguisher case mounted on the wall. Id. The trial court issued summary
judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claim. Id. at 420. The appellate court reversed.
Id. Claiming that the wilfuil and wanton concept did "not add clarity or aid analysis," it
attempted to articulate a fact-intensive standard purportedly based on Restatement
(Second) of Torts concepts of apparent consent and assumption of the risk. Pfister, 627
N.E.2d at 1262-63.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 61.
69. Pfister, 657 N.E.2d at 1017-18.

70. Id. at 1018.
71. See Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (negligence is
finesse);
control and1999
emphasizes
because
it is aofsport
standard for
appropriate
Published by University
of golf
Missouri
School
Lawthat
Scholarship
Repository,
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Missouri also adopted a recklessness standard for contact sports and a
negligence standard for noncontact sports.7' Interestingly, Missouri's test for
actionability under a recklessness standard was enunciated in Niemczyk v.
Burleson,73 a 1976 decision that recognized claims for negligence. In Niemczyk,
the Missouri Court of Appeals listed eight factors for a court to consider in
determining whether a plaintiff stated a cause of action for recklessness. They
were: (1) the specific game involved, (2) the ages and physical attributes of the
participants, (3) the level of skill of the participants, (4) the participants'
knowledge of its rules and customs, (5) whether they are amateurs or
professionals, (6) the types of risks which inhere to the game and those outside
the realm of reasonable anticipation, (7) the presence or absence of protective
equipment, and (8) the degree of zest with which the game was being played.74
When the Missouri Supreme Court overruled Niemczyk in 1982 in Ross v.
75
Clouser,
it nonetheless approved the use of the Niemczyk factors and did not
explain how the decision changed Missouri law.
Missouri and Illinois are the only jurisdictions that have explicitly
recognized different standards of care for contact and noncontact sports. Eleven

Novak v. Virene, 586 N.E.2d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (negligence is standard for skiing
because, although collisions with other skiers are possible, they are not inevitable).
72. See Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (adopting a recklessness
standard for contact sports); Gamble v. Bost, 901 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that negligence standard is proper in bowling, which is not a contact sport).
73. 538 S.W.2d 737, 741-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
74. Ross, 637 S.W.2d at 14 (quoting Niemczyk, 538 S.W.2d at 741-42).
75. 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
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states--California,76 Connecticut, 77 Kentucky, 78 Louisiana, 79 Massachusetts, 0
Nebraska,8' New Jersey,82 New Mexico,83 New York,8 Ohio, 5 and
Texas 86-have recognized recklessness 7 as the sole standard governing all sport-

76. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several respects:
Reckless misconduct... differs from that form of negligence which
consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure
to take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a
possible future emergency, in that reckless misconduct requires a
conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the

serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only
from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that
negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge
that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless
must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in

amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The
difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only
such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a

difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so
marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1965).
77. Jaworski v. Kieman, 696 A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997).

78. Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1995).
79. Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d (La. Ct. App. 1990).
80. Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989).
81. Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990).
82. Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994).
83. Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
84. Turcotte v. Fell, 474 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
85. Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990).
86. Greer v. Davis, 921 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
87. Many of the opinions adopted the definition of recklessness found in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
s. 500 Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another ifhe does
an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
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participant cases. Arizona,8" Nevada,8 9 and Wisconsin" have adhered to the
negligence standard. 9'
Only one reported decision considered whether professional players can
incur liability for on-field actions when no intentional tort is alleged. In
Hackbart v. CincinnatiBengals, Inc., a federal court applying Colorado law

recognized a recklessness theory in an action by professional football players.92
The suit stemmed from an incident that occurred after the Denver Broncos
intercepted a Cincinnati Bengals's pass. 93 The plaintiff, who had just attempted
a block, watched the play following the interception with one knee on the
ground.94 Acting out of anger and frustration, a Bengals player struck the
plaintiff in the back of the head with a blow of sufficient force to cause both
players to fall to the ground. 95
During a bench trial, the judge made a finding that professional football
players are prone to "flare ups" and fighting.9 6 Because Hackbart was an
experienced player who recognized that he might be injured when other players
flared up but chose to play the game anyway, the court held that he assumed the
risk of the other player's action and could not recover.97 The trial court then
considered the "larger question of whether playing field action in the business
of professional football should become a subject of the courts" in an extended
discussion of social policy. 9 Finding no judicially discernable code of conduct
for professional football players, it concluded civil courts are ill-equipped to
second-guess what occurs on the NFL "battlefield." 99
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took issue with the district court's
determination that tort principles are inapplicable to professional football.100
Concerned that adopting the district court's nonintervention policy would mean
victims of unlawful blows would have retaliation as their sole remedy, the court
ruled that recklessness was the appropriate standard by which to judge the claim
and remanded the case to the district court.' 0 1

88. Estes v. Tripson, 932 P.2d 1364 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).

89. Auckenthaler v. Grundemeyer, 877 P.2d 1039 (Nev. 1994).
90. Lestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993) (possibly
abrogated by statute).
91. These decisions stress that negligence, when properly understood, is the better
rule. See, e.g., Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 32.

92. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
93. Hackbart,601 F.2d at 519.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Hackbart,435 F. Supp. at 355.
97. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. Colo. 1977).
98. Id. at 357-58.
99. Id. at 358.
100. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
101. Id. at 521.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
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As alluded to above, the focus of many early (and some recent) opinions is
whether the plaintiff "assumed the risk" of injury and not whether the defendant
breached the duty of care owed by one player to another. These discussions are
often confusing because contemporary scholarship recognizes that the generic
term assumption of risk refers to at least two different concepts. 10 2
The Harper, James, and Gray treatise on torts distinguishes between
primary and secondary assumption of risk. °3 In its primary sense, the plaintiff's
assumption of risk is an analogue to the defendant's lack of duty.'04 Just as
"tails" is another way of expressing "not heads," "plaintiff assumed the risk" is
another way of expressing "defendant was not negligent" or, more precisely, that
the defendant was under no obligation to protect the plaintiff from that risk.
Assumption of risk in the primary sense is a policy-driven concept that flows
from the legal relationship of the parties, not their subjective expectations."
The duty of care that attends this relationship is a question of law reserved to the
court. °
In its secondary sense, assumption of risk is a subjective standard.0 7 If the
plaintiff knows, understands, and appreciates a risk and deliberately encounters
it, he assumes that risk in the secondary sense of the term. If he unreasonably
exposes himself to the risk, he is also comparatively or contributorily
negligent.'0o The key issues are the plaintiff's actual appreciation of, and
willingness to encounter, the particular risk. These are factual determinations
usually reserved to the jury. 1"
In many of the early cases relying on "assumption of risk," it is often
unclear whether the plaintiff was barred from recovery because the defendant
was not negligent or because the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encountered
the risk. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.,110 one of the first decisions
recognizing the concept of assumption of risk (albeit in a non-sports context), is
illustrative. In Murphy, the plaintiff, who was injured when he fell on an

102. See generallyHARPER ET AL., supra note 35, ch. XXI.
103. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 21.0. This view has earned judicial
support in a number ofjurisdictions. For a list of cases, see HARPER ET AL., supranote
35, § 21.0, at n.4.
104. HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 21.0.
105. HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 21.1.
106. HARPER ETAL., supra note 35, § 21.1.
107. HARPER ETAL., supra note 35, § 21.0.
108. HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 21.0, at 189 n.3. Many jurisdictions no
longer recognize secondary assumption of risk as a separate doctrine. Instead, they
analyze a plaintiff's conduct under comparative negligence principles. See, e.g., Knight

v. Jewitt, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
109. HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 21.0; KEETON ET AL., supranote 35, § 67,
at 453-54.
166 N.E. of
173Missouri
(N.Y. 1929).
Published 110.
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amusement park attraction called "The Flopper,"". alleged that the ride was
improperly equipped to protect persons who were unaware of its dangers. In his
opinion denying recovery, Judge Cardozo indicated that the plaintiff assumed the
risk:
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so
far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a
thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact
with the ball.... Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment of
onlookers when [the plaintiff] made his choice to join them. He took the

chance of a like fate, with whatever damage to his body might ensue from
such a fall. The timorous may stay at home." 2
The plaintiff willingly took a chance when he stepped on the ride. That he
suffered an unexpected injury was irrelevant because he appreciated the risk that
he might fall." 3 However, the opinion also detected "no adequate basis" for
finding that "The Flopper" was negligently operated. Thus, it is unclear whether
the plaintiff also would have been barred from recovery had he been unaware of
the risk of falling. Early sports-injury cases involving baseball,"' basketball," 5
football," 6 and ice skating".7 provide similar examples of this ambiguity.
Subsequent decisions made clear that the plaintiff's subjective knowledge
of the risk often was not the critical issue. Instead, voluntary participants in
lawful sports were held to assume, as a matter of law, all ordinary and obvious
risks of that sport.' 8

111. Id. at 173-74. The "Flopper" was a moving belt that ran on an inclined plane.
It was surrounded by padded walls. The belt stopped and started suddenly, causing
standing passengers to "flop" to the floor. Id.
112. Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 174-75.
114. See Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. Ct. App.
1961) (the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury because he knew of the danger of flying
bats in the game of"workup," but the defendant was not negligent because he wiped his
sweaty hands before picking up the bat).
115. See Kerby v. Elk Grove Union High Sch. Dist., 36 P.2d 431 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1934) (the plaintiff knew the risk of being hit by thrown ball, but the defendant was
not negligent in throwing it). See also Albers v. Independent Sch. Dist., 487 P.2d 936
(Idaho 1971) (colliding with other players).
116. See Vendrell v. School Dist., 376 P.2d 406 (Or. 1962) (football player knew
the risk of injuries from tackling by other players, but other players did not tackle
negligently).
117. See Moe v. Steenburg, 147 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1966) (the plaintiff knew of
the risk of collisions with other skaters, but the defendant was not negligent when he
skated backwards for approximately twenty feet without looking behind him).
118. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 49, § 8.02, at 936 & n.24 (citing an
extensive
list of cases that apply this principle in sports such as alpine skiing, balance
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
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The vitality of the affirmative defense of assumption of risk has received
little judicial ink because most of the decisions simply discuss the limited duty
of care owed by one participant to another, or whether recklessness or
negligence should be the appropriate standard." 9 In jurisdictions that have
retained the defense despite the adoption of comparative fault, a plaintiffs
assumption of risk remains a total bar. Missouri, for example, recognizes
assumption of risk as a defense to reckless misconduct if there is sufficient
evidence that a plaintiff knew and appreciated a particular risk (such as risks of
collisions between opposing players at home plate). In this case, a plaintiff
cannot recover for injuries caused by a particular risk if she nonetheless proceeds
in the face of that risk (such as by playing in catcher position).'
In jurisdictions where secondary assumption of risk is subsumed by
comparative fault, a defendant cannot interpose an affirmative defense of
assumption of risk to bar recovery by a plaintiff who deliberately, albeit
reasonably, encounters the risk of his reckless misconduct. 2 ' Instead, the jury

beam, baseball, basketball, blanket toss, boat and water skiing, bobsled, chinning bar,
fishing, football, golf, gym horse, gym mat, monkey bar, mutual combat, parallel bars,
pool, racing, rodeo, rope jumping, skydiving, springboard, still rings, surfing, table
tennis, toboggan, trampoline, and tumbling).
119. There is a split of authority among both academics and courts regarding the
general viability of the defense. The academic lines were sharply drawn during the
advisory discussions surrounding the Restatement (Second) of Torts. On the one side
were those who favored retaining the defense. On the other, those who advocated
analyzing the issue solely in terms of contributory or comparative negligence. As told
by Justice Greenhill in Halepeska v. CallihanInterests,Inc., the advisors were sharply
divided on this issue:
A group mainly of distinguished deans and professors, favored striking the
entire chapter of Assumption of Risk [from the Restatement]. They would use
contributory negligence. The group includes Deans Page, Keeton and Wade,
and Professors James, Malone, Morris, Seavey and Thurman. Mr. Eldredge
prepared a "dissent" for this group. The group is referred to in the notes to
the draft as "The Confederacy." Others including Prosser, Professor Robert
Keeton, and Judges Fee, Flood, Traynor and Goodrich supported the
existence of the defense of assumed risk. The distinguished scholars refer to
the debate, among themselves, as "The Battle of the Wilderness."
Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 n.3 (Tex. 1963). Those who
favored retaining the defense won the battle for the Restatement. Section 496C, entitled
"Implied Assumption of Risk," states:
[A] plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things
caused by the defendant's conduct ... and who nevertheless voluntarily
chooses to enter or remain . . . within the area of that risk, under
circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to
recover for harm within that risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
120. See supra note 119.
121. See e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
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may allocate fault and damages to a plaintiff only to the extent the her
participation in the activity is deemed unreasonable. However, in California, a
state that has abrogated assumption of risk and adopted comparative fault, case
law suggests that a jury should consider the fact that a plaintiff reasonably has
chosen to play a particular sport in allocating fault." In contrast, Florida seems

to be the only jurisdiction that has specifically retained the affirmative defense
in sports litigation despite its abrogation in other contexts.I13
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club,'24 a court applying Illinois contact
sports law was for the first time presented with a case involving professional
athletes. The opinion is brief, ostensibly due to the dearth of case law in the
context of professional sports.' 25
The court first examined amateur contact sports law. Missouri, according
to the court, had "essentially adopted" the Illinois standard, and thus the court
looked to both Illinois and Missouri law, 126 and Pfister,2 7 Nabozy,128 and
Ross 2 9 in particular. Finding no Missouri or Illinois cases30 applying contact
3
sports law to professional sports, the court turned to Averil1 and Hackbart. '
Noting that voluntary participants in sports assume all obvious risks
incident to the game, the court undertook a practical analysis of concepts of duty,
consent, and assumption of the risk by applying the factors discussed in Ross to
the case at hand.3 2 The court recognized the rough and often violent nature of
professional hockey, where tripping, slashing, and fighting among players is

122. Id.
123. See Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78, 79-80 (Fla. 1983) (noting that despite
the abolition of implied assumption of risk, assumption of risk must remain a viable
defense to negligence actions stemming from athletic endeavors if sports are to continue
to serve a legitimate recreational function).
124. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
125. Id. at 212.
126. Id. at 211.
127. Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. 1995). For a discussion of Pfister,see
supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
128. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (III. App. Ct. 1975). For a discussion
of Nabozny, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
129. Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982). For a discussion of Ross, see
supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
130. Averill v. Luttrell, 311 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957). For a discussion
of Averill, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
131. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979). For a
discussion of Hackbart, see supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
132. McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Mo. Ct. App.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
1998).
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commonplace.' 33 The court further found that rule infractions were frequent and
intentional. 3 ' As to the players, the court found that they were highly skilled,
sometimes highly paid athletes who were well aware of the inherent violence of
the sport.'35 The court also took notice of internal league mechanisms for
penalizing rule violators and compensating injured players.'36
In conclusion, the court found the specific conduct at issue to be, for better
or worse, "part of the game" of professional hockey and not outside the realm
of reasonable anticipation of the players.'37 The
court therefore held that the
38
conduct was not actionable as a matter of law.
V. COMMENT
By holding that conduct that is part of the game of professional hockey is
not actionable even when it violates several rules and results in injury, McKichan
v. St. Louis Hockey Club goes a long way in insulating professional hockey
players from civil liability. The decision raises several interesting questions
about the appropriate duty of care owed by one professional athlete to another,
and the role the court should play in determining when a player should be subject
to civil suit.
In McKichan, the court seemed to struggle with the question of whether the
"recklessness" standard adopted by Illinois courts in contact sports cases should
apply to professional cases. It left the question unanswered, however, when it
opted to use the factors adopted in Missouri cases as its analytical framework.
The court's reluctance to determine whether Twist's act was "reckless" is
understandable. As aptly noted by Professor Lazaroff, using a recklessness
standard to determine when sports conduct should be actionable "brings to mind
the proverbial attempt to fit a square peg in to a round hole." '39 This is
particularly true in professional hockey, where players anticipate and typically
encounter contact that is "reckless" by laymen standards. Not only body
checking but also vigorously attempting to gain control of the puck at close
quarters arguably involves great risks of danger. Exposing players to jury
review in every instance that might be considered reckless would lead to
anomalous results.
The McKichan analysis avoids these problems. Only if a player does
something that a court considers "outside the realm of reasonable anticipation"
of the other players could he be subject to suit. Thus, players will not have to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at213.
Id.
Id.
McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Lazaroff, supranote 31, at 213.
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worry about defending their on-field conduct to a jury if they comport their
behavior to what experience tells them is acceptable. According to the decision,
this seems to include most instances of fighting, slashing, and body checking
because these acts are commonplace.
On the other hand, the court's decision protects rough-playing defendants
like Twist at the expense of plaintiffs like McKichan who might believe that
conduct outside of the written rules is not an acceptable form of play. Certainly
not all players share the same willingness to submit to all contacts that are "part
of the game" of professional hockey. For example, some players whose games
are based on skill and finesse rarely engage in conduct that sends them to the
penalty box, while others frequently engage in violent play. The objective
analysis adopted by McKichan seems unwilling to recognize that players'
differing expectations should have a bearing on whether the conduct will be
considered actionable. Instead, it indicates that courts should adopt an
essentially laissezfaire approach and recognize a cause of action only when no
player could reasonably anticipate the act.
As a matter of policy, the court's position is sound. Persons who
voluntarily choose to engage in sporting events should be held to accept as a
matter of law the normal range of risks inherent in the sport. Not only is this
approach consistent with the principle of volenti nonfit injuria,but, as a practical
matter, it also is the only approach that does not have the potential to
fundamentally alter the nature of competitive play. Any attempt at drawing fine
lines of actionability in professional sports cases might lead to detrimental
judicial oversight simply because judges and jurors are not well-equipped to
analyze close cases. The court's analysis wisely leaves most decisions about onfield conduct to league officials and limits relief to league remedies. Unlike
judges or jurors, officials are familiar with the customs and rules of their sport
and are therefore better able to determine when an aggressive act exceeds the
norm."4 Furthermore, leagues have in place their own mechanisms to discipline
unruly players, which may be more effective than civil penalties. Professional
league commissioners have broad disciplinary powers, including the power to
resolve disputes between players, impose fines, and suspend players from

140. See Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Demis, Revisiting Excessive Violence
in the ProfessionalSports Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?, 6 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 127, 151 (1996).
In hockey, this is particularly true. Although the uninitiated may not believe it,
even hockey "tough guys" abide by an unwritten code of conduct, with which the
referees are familiar and jurors and judges generally are not. When a player crosses the
line of "no sucker punching, no taking advantage of an injured foe, no jumping a guy
when he's gassed at the end of a shift and no pairing off against a nonheavyweight unless
he's a jerk who really has it coming." Murphy, supra note 2. The referees and the
leagues
are better able to assess the situation and impose the proper penalties.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/7
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games.' 4 ' "[D]ecisions of the league can be swift, certain, and severe,"' 42 unlike
litigation, which often takes years to reach trial.'43
Those with misgivings about the routine violence of professional sports like
hockey may criticize the efficacy of analysis in McKichan. It has been argued
that customary violent conduct should not, as a matter of law, be considered
unreasonable when violence has been encouraged to promote patronage." This
potential criticism is misplaced for three reasons. First, it ignores the strong
bargaining power of professional players. Through their collective bargaining
agreements, professional athletes influence intemal league disciplinary standards
and procedures, which in turn deter violent players in the league.' 45 Other
bargained-for protections, such as career-ending disability policies and
standardized contract clauses, obviate the need for the legal system to
compensate injured players. Second, professional players are professional.
They have well-defined expectations about the games they play and the customs
involved. Unlike amateurs, they know with a high degree of certainty what to
expect on a given night from a particular player and can take measures to protect
themselves accordingly. Third, imposing civil sanctions in close cases might
subject players to liability even when their conduct complies with the sport's
customs. Customs would give way as players circumscribed their conduct to
keep within judicially imposed standards. Thus, recognizing liability in close
cases might be tantamount to regulating professional sports through the
judiciary.
Judicial policy-making in this area seems particularly inappropriate. To a
certain degree, popular professional sports reflect what society wants. As
business enterprises, professional leagues are sensitive to how the public feels
about them. When fans are turned off, leagues try to reform their image to bring
them back. The courts need not "regulate" sports when they are responsive to
public sentiment. And if a particular sport affronts society, the legislature
is the
46
appropriate forum to either regulate or ban what is objectionable.
Although McKichan decided a case involving professional athletes, other
courts would do well to take notice of its reasoning in actions involving amateur
players. What one can draw from the often confusing (and sometimes artificial)
discussions of assumption of risk, consent, and limited duty is that courts are

141. See NHL Constitution and Bylaws, Article VI; NHL Collective Bargaining
Agreement, Art. 18; NFL Constitution and Bylaws Article VIII; NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement, Art. XI. Players may be (and often are) fined and suspended.
142. Hanson & Demis, supra note 140, at 151.
143. One also may question the deterrent effect of civil damages on hockey players

like Twist whose pocket depth is directly proportional to their ability to "enforce" on the
ice.
144. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, 240 n.17.
145. See NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 23; NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement, Arts. XII, XLIX, LI, & LIV.
146. Professional boxing is an example of a sport regulated by legislation.
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willing to intervene when a participant does something totally unexpected under
the circumstances. Opinions that make reference to the factors used by Missouri
courts make clear that analysis in sports injury cases does not strictly follow
traditional tort principles, but instead considers the foreseeability of the
defendant's action under the circumstances of a particular game and level of
play. 47 By adopting Missouri's multi-factor test, courts would be more
forthright in their reasoning and acknowledge that, except in extreme cases of
misconduct by players, sports should be played primarily on the field and not in
the courtroom.
VI. CONCLUSION
In McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club,148 the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Eastern District of Missouri ruled that conduct that is "part of the game" of
professional hockey is not actionable as a matter of law. The decision protects
professional leagues from unnecessary and potentially detrimental judicial
oversight, and it allows players to gauge their potential for liability by comparing
their game conduct to that of their peers. In addition, the McKichan court's
explicitly contextual analysis, which avoids confusing (and sometimes artificial)
discussions of assumption of risk, consent, and limited duty, is a solid model that
should be followed by future courts when they consider entertaining civil actions
by one sports participant against another.
HEIDI C. DOERHOFF

147. See supra,notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
148. 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
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